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Statement of Jurisdiction 
We defer to Mr. Murray's statement of jurisdiction. 
Court of Appeals Citation 
Murray v. Labor Commission, 2012 UT App 33, 271 P.3d 192. 
Statement of the Issues and Standards of Review 
This Court has granted certiorari specifically to address two issues: (1) whether 
the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review, and (2) whether the Labor 
Commission and the court of appeals properly applied the test for legal causation laid 
out in the seminal Utah Supreme Court case of Allen v. Industrial Commission.1 
Throughout this brief, we will refer to that as "the Allen test" or "the Allen standard/7 
The appropriate standard of review is, of course, a key question before this 
Court. The court of appeals, guided by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act2 and 
significant caselaw, used an abuse-of-discretion standard to review the Labor 
Commission's decision. To determine whether the Commission abused its discretion, 
the court of appeals applied a test of reasonableness and rationality, looking closely to 
ensure that the Commission liberally construed and applied the Workers' Compensation 
Act in favor of the injured employee.3 
1
 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
2
 Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i). 
3
 Murray v. Labor Commission, 2012 UT App 33 at H 27, 271 P.3d 192, 701 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 28. 
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Determinative Statutes 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-403. Judicial Review - Formal Adjudicative Proceedings. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and 
rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-1-301. Commission Jurisdiction and Power. 
The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to 
determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter or any other title or chapter it 
administers. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-401. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
(1) An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the dependents of 
each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not 
purposely self inflicted, shall be paid: 
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death; 
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for: 
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services; 
(ii) medicines; and 
2 
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(iii) in case of death, the amount of funeral expenses. 
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and hospital 
services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be: 
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance carrier; and 
(b) not on the employee. 
(3) Payment of benefits provided by this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, shall commence within 30 calendar days after any final award by the 
commission. 
Statement of the Case and Facts 
We defer to the court of appeals' recitation of the facts and procedural history, 
along with those of the Labor Commission in the orders attached to Mr. Murray's brief. 
We note that the facts are not a subject of this review. 
Summary of Argument 
Mr. Murray had a pre-existing condition that subjects him to the higher standard 
for proving legal causation laid out in Allen. The Labor Commission considered his 
accident and determined that it did not involve unusual or extraordinary conditions and 
thus did not increase the risk of injury that we all face in typical non-employment life. 
Based on this, the Commission found that Mr. Murray could not carry his burden of 
proving legal causation and thus his injuries are not compensable under the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act. The court of appeals used an appropriate standard of 
review to examine the Commission's decision and found - using an appropriate 
application of the Allen standard - that the Commission's decision was reasonable and 
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rational and thus not an abuse of its discretion to apply the Workers' Compensation Act. 
The court of appeals' analysis is in perfect keeping with the plain language of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act as well as the plain language and the intent of the Allen 
decision. This Court should affirm the court of appeals' decision. 
Argument 
Issue #1: Standard of Review. Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, if an 
agency has a statutory grant of authority to apply the law at issue, appellate courts 
should use an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing the agency's action. The 
Labor Commission Act grants the Commission authority to apply the Workers' 
Compensation Act. This case involves the Commission's application of the Workers' 
Compensation Act. Did the court of appeals err in using an abuse-of-discretion standard 
of review? 
After a thorough survey of relevant statues and caselaw, the court of appeals 
determined that the Commission's decision in this case is subject to an abuse-of-
discretion standard of review. Mr. Murray takes issue with this conclusion. The court of 
appeals is right. 
The court of appeals looked first to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
("UAPA") to determine the appropriate standard of review, noting that this Court "has 
held that the several grounds for judicial relief set forth in what is now section 63G-4-
403(4) necessarily 'incorporate[] standards that appellate courts are to employ when 
4 
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reviewing allegations of agency error/"4 Writing for the court, Judge Voros noted that 
"mixed questions of law and fact are generally reviewed for correctness, granting no 
deference to the agency"5 but "'a[n] exception to this general rule exists if the 
legislature has either explicitly or implicitly granted discretion to the agency' to interpret 
or apply the law/'6 The court went on to explain that, "When a statute delegates 
discretion to the agency, the court reviews the agency action under Utah Code section 
63G-4-403(4)(h)(i), which authorizes relief when agency action constitutes 'an abuse of 
the discretion delegated to the agency by statute/"7 
After identifying the potential standards for mixed questions of law and fact, the 
court of appeals looked next to determine whether the legislature has granted the Labor 
Commission discretion to apply the law. The law at issue in this case is UTAH CODE ANN. § 
34A-2-401. Specifically, the core dispute is whether or not Mr. Murray's claimed injuries 
arose out of his employment. To determine whether the Commission has discretion to 
apply this section, the court of appeals looked at the Labor Commission Act, which 
provides that "The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and 
authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter or any other title or 
4
 Murray at H 11 (quoting Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 584 
(Utah 1991)). 
5
 Id at A 12 (citing Morton Int'l at 587-588). 
6
 Id at U 12(quoting Esquivel v. Labor Commission, 2000 UT 66, H 14,191 P.2d 1352). 
7
 Id. 
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chapter it administers/7 The Utah Workers' Compensation Act is a chapter that the 
Labor Commission administers.9 In fact, the Labor Commission has exclusive jurisdiction 
to hear and decide claims from injured workers seeking benefits under the Workers7 
Compensation Act.10 Because of this, the court of appeals found that the Commission 
has statutory discretion to apply the law at issue and thus UAPA requires an abuse-of-
discretion standard of review in this case. 
Murray argues that the court of appeals' analysis on this point is inconsistent with 
Esquivel v. Labor Commission.11 In that case, this Court noted that: 
We have never previously viewed Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 as a broad 
grant of discretion to the Labor Commission. In fact, we have, upon 
numerous occasions since this statute became effective July 1, 1997, 
reviewed Commission decisions concerning questions of law under the 
correctness standard We are not convinced, and do not conclude that 
section 34A-1-301 provides a general grant of discretion to the Labor 
Commission for statutory interpretation.12 
But the court of appeals distinguishes Esquivel by pointing out that it examined the 
question of whether section 34A-1-301 grants the Commission discretion to interpret 
8
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-1-301 (2011). 
9
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-1-103 and 104 (2011). 
10
 Sheppick v. Albertson's, Inc., 922 P.2d 769 (Utah 1996); Woldberg v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 74 Utah 309, 279 P. 609, 611 (1929); United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co. 
v. Evans, 35 F.2d 459, 461 (8th Cir. 1929), cert, denied, 281 U.S. 744, 50 S. Ct. 350, 74 L 
Ed. 1157 (1930). 
11
 2000 UT 66, 191 P.2d 1352. 
12
 Id at H 17-18 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
& 
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the law. Judge Voros noted that "this limitation on the Commission's discretion to 
interpret the law does not extend to its discretion to apply the law."13 
While this distinction may seem narrow on its face, a deeper examination reveals 
that it is a very worthy difference to point out. In Esquivel, this Court examined the 
Commission's interpretation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A~2-106(5) - a provision that 
addresses disbursement of a third-party recovery. After referencing "numerous 
occasions" when the Court reviewed questions of law under a correctness standard 
since July 1, 1997, the Esquivel court cited four cases: (1) Vigos v. Mountainland 
Builders, Inc., which examined the Commission's interpretation of a statute of limitation 
in the Workers' Compensation Act;14 (2) Christensen v. Spanish Fork City- a companion 
case to Vigos that reviewed the Commission's interpretation of the same statute and 
included no discussion of the standard of review;15 (3) Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co., 
where this Court examined the interpretation of a notice provision and stated that it 
was reviewing the court of appeals' interpretation of the section for correctness, not the 
Commission's,16 and; (4) Brown & Root Industrial Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n, which 
involved the question of whether an amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act 
Murray at H 20 (emphasis in original); see also Martinez i/. Media-Paymaster 
Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 UT 42, 164 P.3d 384 (pointing out 
Esquivel1s holding that section 34A-1-301 does not grant the Commission discretion for 
statutory interpretation). 
14
 2000 UT 2; 993 P.2d 207. 
15
 2000 UT 13; 994 P.2d 1252. 
16
 956 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1998). 
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should apply retroactively — a question that the Court explicitly labeled one of statutory 
construction (i.e., interpretation).17 
The Labor Commission is an administrative agency with a very specific statutory 
charge to administer the Labor Code. It is not a court of general jurisdiction and thus is 
not typically in the business of interpreting statutes. But in this case, the dispute does 
not involve any statutory construction or other interpretation of the law. In fact, the 
Allen court already provided the relevant interpretation of the statutory provision at 
issue. The dispute involves the Commission's application of the Allen standard to the 
facts of Mr. Murray's case, and the court of appeals is right that this is something that 
the legislature has explicitly granted the Commission discretion to do. 
Mr. Murray argues that section 34A-1-301 is simply a recognition that "the 
administrative law judges, commissioners, and the appeals board at the Labor 
Commission have similar powers and authorities of judges in the Utah court system" 
with respect to the Workers' Compensation Act and other laws it administers.18 In his 
words, that section "basically declares their authority to do the job given them."19 While 
we aren't completely on board with the comparison to judges in the district or appellate 
courts, we agree that section 34A-1-301 is an enabling provision of sorts in that it grants 
947 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1997). 
Br. of Pet. at 19. 
a 
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the Commission the authority and discretion to do its job. And its job is to apply the 
Workers'Compensation Act. 
If the Labor Commission has not been granted discretion to apply the Workers7 
Compensation Act, then what does it possibly have discretion to do? As this court 
pointed out in Sheppick: 
The whole scheme of the Workers' Compensation Act contemplates that 
only the Commission can make awards of benefits under the Act and the 
necessary factual and legal conclusions in support thereof. Not only do the 
terms of the Act refer exclusively to the Commission in those sections 
dealing with the adjudication of claims and the award of benefits, but the 
Commission itself is intended to develop and apply the kind of expertise 
that grows out of the special situations to which the Act applies and to give 
full force to the remedial provisions of the Act.20 
Considering this explanation, we believe that the court of appeals was exactly right 
when it held that "section 34A-3-301 explicitly gives the Commission discretion to apply 
the law to the cases before it, including those involving the Workers7 Compensation Act 
and the 'arising out of provision of section 34A-2-401(l)."21 
Finally, Mr. Murray argues that Drake v. Industrial Commission22 introduced a 
standard of review that displaces the UAPA standards. Drake examined a course-and-
scope-of-employment question centered on the long-established "going and coming" 
doctrine, which generally views employees as outside the course of their employment 
while traveling to and from work, and the "special errand" rule, which is a recognized 
Sheppick v. Albertson's, Inc., 922 P.2d 769, 775 (Utah 1996). 
Murray at H 21. 
939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997). 
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exception to the going and coming doctrine. In addressing the standard of review, the 
Drake court appealed to the influential criminal case of State v. Pena,23 which prescribed 
an analysis that considers "the factual complexity of the legal standard at issue, the 
reliance of the legal standard on facts observed by the fact finder, and other policy 
considerations/'24 
The Drake court went on to apply the Pena analysis to the special-errand case 
before it. In determining the appropriate standard of review, the court considered the 
"highly fact-sensitive" nature of special-errand cases, the fact that the court "has had 
few occasions to address particular fact situations to which the special errand rule 
arguably applies/' making it unlikely that it could craft a broadly applicable legal rule, 
and the general policy that courts should construe the Workers' Compensation Act 
liberally in favor of coverage.25 From those factors, the court extracted a standard for 
reviewing special-errand cases that "'conveys a measure of discretion to [the 
Commission] when applying that standard to a given set of facts/"26 
As Judge Voros points out, the Drake court did not give any direct insight into 
"[w]hether this measure was a millimeter or a mile."27 Instead, the Drake court simply 
839 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
Murray at H 23. 
Drake, 939 P.2d at 182. 
Id. (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 939) (bracketed material in original). 
Murray at H 24. 
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said that it was "disposed to give heightened deference to the Commission" but, 
because of the policy considerations, still "exercise some scrutiny."28 
In 2007, this Court revisited its standard-of-review analysis from Drake when it 
decided Salt Lake City Corp v. Labor Commission.29 In that case, the Court examined the 
going~and-coming rule more generally and applied a "conditionally deferential" 
standard of review grounded in two considerations: (1) the fact that "the multifarious 
array of factual settings presented by scope-of-employment cases" makes it difficult for 
the Court to "craft coherent and evolving legal rules," and (2) the Court's "statutory 
obligation to give effect to the Act's purpose" compels it to "look closely to assure 
ourselves that the Commission has liberally construed and applied the act to provide 
coverage and has resolved any doubt respecting the right to compensation in favor of 
an injured employee." 
Mr. Murray maintains that this is the standard that should apply to his case. He 
argues that "[t]he fact that Drake and Salt Lake City Corp. are 'course of employment' 
cases . . . and [this] case . . . is an 'arising out of . . . employment' case provides no good 
rationale for utilizing a different standard of review." We disagree. There are several 
good reasons to apply a different standard to the immediate case than the one applied 
in Drake and Salt Lake City Corp. 
Drake, 939 P.2d at 182. 
2007 UT4, 153 P.3d 179. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 2007 UT 4, H 14-16. 
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First, the standard in Drake and Salt Lake City Corp was explicitly based primarily 
on two things that are very specific to those cases: (1) the very nature of going-and-
coming cases, and (2) the fact that there is not much appellate caselaw examining the 
fact situations that might fall within the going-and-coming and special-errand doctrines 
and the resulting difficulty in crafting a widely applicable legal rule for those cases. Since 
this is not a going-and-coming case, these factors do not apply. While "arising out o f 
cases like this one may be highly fact-driven, there is already a widely applicable legal 
rule for those cases. In fact, it may be the most well-known and influential rule in all of 
Utah workers7 compensation law - namely, the Allen standard itself. The Allen standard 
is the very type of "coherent and evolving legal rule" that Salt Lake City Corp. explains is 
lacking in going-and-coming cases. 
Next, as the court of appeals points out, this Court has explicitly disclaimed any 
relevance that Drake or Pena might have to UAPA standard-of-review cases. Writing for 
the Court in Westside Dixon Assocs., LLC v. Utah Power & Light Co./Pacificorp, Justice 
Durham pointed out that "all parties to this petition cite Drake v. Industrial Comm'n 
regarding appropriate agency standards of review. We note that Drake was not a UAPA 
case, an observation that applies to State v. Pena as well."31 While we understand that 
Salt Lake City Corp. was decided after Westside Dixon, we agree with the court of 
appeals that, "in Salt Lake City Corp., the court did not cite to Westside Dixon or discuss 
31
 2002 UT 31, H 8 n.l, 44 P.3d 775 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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Westside Dixon's gloss on Drake. We therefore do not understand the supreme court to 
have jettisoned Westside Dixon on this point/'32 
Mr. Murray's case is a UAPA case, and that alone is ample reason not to apply the 
Drake standard of review here. It would be difficult to justify substituting a standard 
borrowed from criminal law in a non-UAPA case that examines a wholly different 
doctrine under a different clause in the law for a standard rooted in statute that directly 
addresses appeals from administrative agencies, like this one. We believe that the court 
of appeals, in its careful and thorough analysis, got the standard-of-review issue right 
and we urge this Court to affirm their decision. 
1.1: A Practical Concern 
The policy that the Workers' Compensation Act should be liberally construed in 
favor of finding coverage is a very longstanding concept that is commonly referred to as 
"the liberality rule/' An examination of its lineage reveals that Utah appellate courts 
have acknowledged and applied that policy since at least 1919 - two years after the 
Workers' Compensation Act was first enacted in its original form.33 The same 
examination reveals that, since then, it has primarily been applied in course-and-scope-
of-employment cases and other cases where the court is trying to determine whether a 
set of facts appropriately brings a claim under the umbrella of workers' compensation 
WatH15. 
Chandler v. Industrial Comm'n, 55 Utah 213,184 P. 1020, 1021-22 (1919). 
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I 
coverage. This is understandable in light of the long-recognized fact that the "whole 
purpose, plan and intent" of the Workers" Compensation Act is to replace common-law 
tort remedies and "to provide a simple, adequate and speedy means to all applicants for 
compensation to have their applications heard and determined upon the merits, and to 
have the acts of the Commission as speedily reviewed by this court by any interested 
party if he thinks that the Commission has exceeded its powers or has disregarded some 
provision in the statute/'35 
While it makes sense that, given that purpose, courts should construe the Act 
liberally to find coverage and bring people into the administrative structure where a 
remedy is ostensibly more easily accessible, the difficulty arises when considering the 
idea that appellate courts will look to ensure that the Commission "resolve[s] any doubt 
respecting the right to compensation in favor of an injured employee/'36 
Such incredibly liberal language is extremely difficult to reconcile with another 
long-established standard that the injured employee has the burden to prove 
entitlement to compensation by a preponderance of the evidence and that "[t]o sustain 
this burden it is not enough to show a state of facts which is equally consistent with no 
34
 See generally Jones v. Industrial Comm'n, 55 Utah 489, 187 P. 833, 836 (1920); M&K 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132,134 (1948); Spencer v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 4 Utah 2d 185, 290 P.2d 692, 694 (1955); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 223, 364 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1961); Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisby, 
678 P.2d 305, 306-7 (Utah 1984); State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 685 P.2d 
1051, 1053 (Utah 1984). 
35
 Woldberg v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 309, 279 P. 609, 611 (1929). 
36
 Salt Lake City Corp., 2007 UT 4,1) 16 (emphasis added). 
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right of compensation as it is with such right Surmise, conjecture, guess, or speculation 
is not sufficient to justify a finding in the plaintiffs behalf."37 The phrase "resolve any 
doubt respecting the right to compensation in favor of the injured employee" sounds, 
on its face, like the most generous imaginable standard. In criminal cases, the 
prosecuting agency typically bears the mother of all burdens of proof: to prove "every 
element of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt."38 If courts were to apply 
a standard that relies strictly on the literal language of the liberality rule, it would 
represent an even more rigorous standard because it would place the burden, for all 
practical purposes, on the employer to show - beyond any doubt - that the injured 
worker does not qualify for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. 
Typically, the concepts of burden of proof and standard of review can be cleanly 
separated and treated independently. But the so-called liberality rule is just a pervading 
doctrine whose full reach is difficult to understand. While it clearly informs standards of 
review, it is not in itself a standard of review. Plus, where it calls for such lavish favor to 
the employee, many view it as wholly inconsistent with the well-established burden of 
proof To prove your entitlement to benefits by a preponderance of the evidence means 
to show that you more likely than not meet the relevant legal standards for a 
compensable claim. Put another way, employees seeking benefits under the Workers' 
Compensation Act can prove entitlement to those benefits by showing that their claim 
37
 Higley v. Industrial Comm'n, 75 Utah 361, 285 P. 306, 308 (1930). 
38
 State v. Greenwood, 2012 UT 48, H 21, 717 Utah Adv. Rep. 40. 
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probably meets the standards for compensability and not merely possibly, meaning that 
there is more evidence for entitlement to benefits than against.39 According to this 
Court, this standard of proof "accommodates the liberal purposes of the act" and is "the 
type of proof that is likely to be available in most cases of this type."40 
The consternation with the liberality rule creeps in with the insinuation that the 
"liberal purposes of the act" are only served by resolving "any doubt" about the right to 
compensation in favor of the injured employee. Luckily, the practical application of the 
rule doesn't appear - at least not blatantly - to have been as egregious as such a 
hyperbolic standard may allow or invite. But, while it is also difficult to gauge exactly 
how germane such a discussion is to the immediate case, we believe that these 
apparently incongruent standards pose a significant possibility for dangerous line 
blurring and some clarification could help practitioners as they try to understand and 
apply the right guidelines. 
Issue #2: The Allen Standard. The Allen court explained that the legal-causation 
standard it announced for workers with preexisting conditions is designed to identify 
injuries that happen "because some condition or exertion required by the employment 
increases the risk of injury which the worker normally faces in his everyday life." This 
standard applies to Mr. Murray's claim. Should this Court limit the Allen analysis to 
Bingham Mines Co. v. Allsop, 59 Utah 306, 203 P. 644, 645 (1921). 
Lipman v. Industrial Comm'n, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1979). 
1 C 
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exertions and ignore or create another standard for the other conditions of Mr. 
Murray's accident? 
The Allen decision is day-one reading for any attorney considering a foray into 
workers' compensation law in Utah. This Court's opinion in Allen probably encapsulates 
and synthesizes more key tenets of workers' compensation law than any other Utah 
case. The issue in Mr. Murray's case centers on the more stringent burden of proof that 
Allen prescribes for workers who have pre-existing conditions that contribute to their 
claimed injuries ("the Allen standard"). Mr. Murray spends several pages of his brief 
dissecting the Allen standard and its application to this case. He argues that the 
Commission misapplied the standard by not considering all of the factors involved in his 
accident41 and that the court of appeals somehow compounded the problem by 
considering all of the factors involved in his accident.42 We maintain that Mr. Murray's 
position on this issue represents a fundamental misreading of the Allen decision and a 
misunderstanding of what it intended to accomplish. 
While we believe that the application of the Allen test is the more important of 
the two issues this Court has agreed to review, we also believe it is the simpler of the 
two to resolve. This is because the Allen opinion itself already addresses all of the 
misgivings that Mr. Murray has about the outcome of his case at the Labor Commission 
and court of appeals. We submit that a genuine and thorough reading of Allen exposes 
41
 Br. of Pet. at 27. 
42
 Br. of Pet. at 29. 
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that Mr. Murray's position is based on key semantic misconceptions and logical fallacies. 
Mr. Murray's proposed solution would only confuse and complicate one of the most 
elegant and widely applied standards in the law. 
In arriving at his position, Mr. Murray has necessarily fixated on a single word in 
the Allen decision: exertion. This is somewhat understandable in that the Allen opinion 
uses that word, in one form or another, quite a bit - 88 times, to be exact. But his 
fixation on and misinterpretation of this word has apparently led him into a logical 
disconnect that has caused him to miss the point of this Court's holding in Allen. The 
Allen standard is designed to test whether an employee's work conditions "increase the 
risk of injury" that we all face in typical non-employment life.43 Writing for the majority 
in Allen, Justice Durham explained that "[t]his additional element of risk in the 
workplace is usually supplied by an exertion greater than that taken in normal, 
everyday life."44 While Mr. Murray concedes at one point that this is an explicit 
acknowledgment by the Court that something besides exertion can demonstrate an 
added risk in the workplace,45 his argument quickly reverts to a premise that the Allen 
standard only contemplates "intentional and exertional workplace activities." 
First, Mr. Murray's linking of exertion with intentionality and voluntariness is 
without basis in Allen or any other law. In fact, the Allen decision never uses the words 
43
 Allen, 729 P.2d at 25 (emphasis added). 
44
 Id. (emphasis added). 
45
 Br. of Pet. at 24. 
46
 Id. at 25. 
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"intentional" or 'Voluntary/' Nevertheless, much of Mr. Murray's argument depends on 
his insistence that the Allen standard only contemplated and only applies cleanly to 
voluntary physical exertions. His baseless assignment of these volitional traits to the 
term "exertion" as used in many contexts in Allen also demonstrates his narrowing of 
the definition of that term beyond what the Allen court likely intended. This imagined 
standard begins to expose the logical vulnerabilities of Mr. Murray's position. 
To demonstrate the flaws in Mr. Murray's reasoning, please allow me to propose 
an analogy. Suppose a law school appointed an employee to oversee new admissions to 
the school. The dean explains to the employee that his charge is to examine each 
application and determine which candidates meet the program's criteria for admission. 
Because the school has a policy of offering admission to any candidate with an LSAT 
score of over 160, the dean explains that the employee will be able to process nnany 
applications simply by looking at the field for LSAT score. Where an applicant has an 
LSAT score of under 160, the employee should consider that score but should also look 
closely at the applicant's undergraduate program, grade point average, extracurricular 
activities, and other relevant factors - the four corners of the application. After the 
employee does this job for a few weeks, the dean starts to receive phone calls from 
applicants with LSAT scores in the high 150s and exceptional grade point averages and 
extracurricular activities. These applicants are confused and disappointed because they 
have received no word from the school about their applications. 
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When the dean approaches the employee about the situation, the employee 
responds that his marching orders were to examine only the applicants' LSAT scores. 
The dean tries to explain that the object was to apply a test of admissibility to the school 
and that the LSAT score was simply one factor in that test. While it was a big factor and 
probably the most determinative single criterion, it was not the sole design of the test 
to be applied. The employee cannot see that he has hopelessly confused the overall test 
with one of its factors. 
We submit that this is what has happened here. The test that Allen prescribes is 
designed to determine whether any element of the injured worker's employment 
increased the risk of injury that we all face in normal, everyday life. The Court explained 
that the most common way to make that determination will be to examine workplace 
exertions. Mr. Murray has confounded the object of the test with a factor to be 
examined in applying it. 
It is clear from its opinion that the Allen court intended to include factors beyond 
simple voluntary physical exertions in the analysis of legal causation. After discussing 
the two-part causation test that Professor Larson described in his treatise and that the 
Court ultimately adopted in Allen, Justice Durham cited seven cases from other 
jurisdictions that had already adopted that test.47 Her descriptions of five of those cases 
include factors beyond physical exertion, including movement, stress and strain, risk of 
47A//en,729P.2dat25n.7. 
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falling, gait, and stress of police work. Under Mr. Murray's analysis, inclusion of these 
factors in a legal causation inquiry would represent an unmerited extension of the Allen 
standard. On the contrary, the Allen court's reliance on these cases in deciding to adopt 
the two-part causation test demonstrates clearly that their intent from the beginning 
was to consider all relevant conditions when examining whether an accident was 
unusual or extraordinary compared to normal, everyday life. 
Toward the end of its opinion, the Court again gave an unmistakable indication of 
its intent to examine more than intentional physical exertion when considering legal 
causation. In explaining its decision to remand the case to the Commission for further 
consideration of legal and medical causation, the Court noted that, because Mr. Allen 
had prior back problems, "to meet the legal causation requirement he must show that 
moving and lifting several piles of dairy products weighing thirty to fifty pounds in the 
confined area of the cooler exceeded the exertion that the average person typically 
undertakes in nonemployment life."49 This factor of the "confined area of the cooler" is 
a key inclusion that reveals several important things about the Allen court's intended 
legal-causation standard. First, it demonstrates that the Court expected the Labor 
Commission, on remand, to consider that non-exertional factor in its examination of 
legal causation. That alone unravels much of Mr. Murray's position. Furthermore, 
because that clause is unquestionably characterized as part of an overall "exertion," its 
48/d. 
49
 Id at 28 (emphasis added). 
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inclusion demonstrates that the Court intended that term to encompass many things 
beyond intentional, easily measured physical exertions. 
Further demonstrating this point is the express purpose of the Allen standard. As 
the court of appeals points out, "an injury is not compensable when it 'occur[s] at work 
because a pre-existing condition results in symptoms which appear during work hours 
without any enhancement from the workplace/ but it is compensable when it 'occurs] 
because some condition or exertion required by the employment increases the risk of 
injury which the worker normally faces in his everyday life/"50 In the same paragraph, 
the court of appeals notes Professor Larson's explanation that the object of the 
standard that this Court adopted in Allen "'is to distinguish work-connected collapses 
from those that are due to normal progression of a disease.'"51 
This is one of the very reasons that the Supreme Court developed the seminal 
standard in Allen - to reduce the chances of an employer bearing liability for an injury 
whose only relationship to work is little more than incidental. Another effect of this 
standard is that employees with preexisting conditions are less likely to be passed over 
for jobs because employers know that there is a mechanism in place to protect them 
50
 Murray, 2012 UT App 33 at H 29 (quoting Allen at 25) (emphasis added) (bracketed 
material in original). 
51
 Id. (quoting Acosta v. Labor Comm'n, 2002 UT App 67, H 23, 44 P.3d 819) (quoting 
Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 46.03[4], at 46-18 
(2001)). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
from inheriting liability for injuries that have little, if anything, to do with any work-
related conditions. 
Considering these aims, it would be impossible to justify affording voluntary 
physical exertion a different standard than any other component of a person's work 
circumstances. If an employee with a preexisting condition cannot show that something 
about the employment circumstances surrounding his accident increased the risk that 
he faces in everyday life, then the employer should not bear liability for that employee's 
injuries. This is a basic principle of legal causation and nothing about the court of 
appeals' decision in this case alters or confuses the standard that this Court announced 
In Allen and that the Labor Commission and Utah appellate courts have applied since its 
publication in 1986. 
In fact, the definition of the word "exertion" is much broader than the voluntary 
physical exertions that Mr. Murray has focused on in his brief. Bryan Garner, 
lexicographer and editor of Black's Low Dictionary, provides two definitions for the verb 
"exert": "(1) to put forth or apply (energy, force, strength, etc.) <the team members 
exerted all their strength and won the tug of war>; or (2) to make a physical or mental 
effort <you can't write well without exerting yourself>."52 Considering this definition, 
the corresponding noun "exertion" necessarily includes myriad things beyond 
intentional physical exertions. In fact, under the light of this definition, essentially all of 
52
 Bryan A. Garner, Garner's Modern American Usage, 3rd ed. 70 (Oxford University 
Press 2009). 
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the elements of Mr. Murray's accident (the effort involved in maintaining his body 
posture, holding the lock, repositioning his feet and hands to catch his balance, even the 
application of the force of the wave on the boat) can be fairly viewed as exertional. 
Mr. Murray argues that use of the adjectives "usual" and "unusual" may work 
when comparing workplace exertions to common non-employment exertions, but that 
such an analysis in comparing employment activities with non-employment activities is 
"just plain silly."53 This argument cannot survive a reading of Allen itself. In summarizing 
the standard to be used to identify the presence or absence of legal causation in cases 
where there is a contributory preexisting condition, the Allen court explained: 
We believe an objective standard of comparison will provide a more 
consistent and predictable standard for the Commission and this Court to 
follow. In evaluating typical nonemployment activity, the focus is on what 
typical nonemployment activities are generally expected of people in 
today's society, not what this particular claimant is accustomed to doing. 
Typical activities and exertions expected of men and women in the latter 
part of the 20th century, for example, include taking full garbage cans to 
the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on an 
automobile, lifting a small child to chest height, and climbing the stairs in 
buildings. By using an objective standard, the case law will eventually 
define a standard for typical "nonemployment activity'1 in much the way 
case law has developed the standard of care for the reasonable man in 
tort law.54 
While the Allen court explained that a claimant with a preexisting condition would 
typically prove legal causation by showing an unusual or extraordinary exertion, the 
actual standard it prescribed is a comparison to "typical nonemployment activity." As 
b3
 Br. of Pet. at 33. 
54
 Allen at 32. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the court of appeals noted three years after the Allen decision, "it is important that the 
examples [listed by the Allen court] consist of a set of circumstances, including as only 
one factor the weight of the object. Indeed, the court said the determination whether 
an activity is usual or unusual can only be made 'on the facts of each case.'"55 
The court of appeals - as they did with the standard-of-review issue - engaged in 
a useful discussion about the Allen legal-causation standard and its application to this 
case.56 The court of appeals correctly considered all of the circumstances involved in Mr. 
Murray's accident and concluded that, "[l]ooking at Murray's exertion as well as the 
working conditions that Murray faced at the time of the accident - including the outside 
force to which Murray reacted - we find nothing unusual or extraordinary when 
compared to everyday life."57 The court of appeals' discussion and conclusion in this 
case represents an immaculate application of the Allen standard, including its 
requirement that the Commission and courts examine all employment conditions when 
considering legal causation. The court of appeals gave additional shape to the analysis 
by listing several examples of everyday activities that are comparable to Mr. Murray's 
accident. As they note, "people would not typically face Murray's exact scenario in 
everyday life, [but] it is similar to the activities and exertions common to everyday 
Smith & Edwards Co. v. Industrial Commission, 770 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (quoting Allen at 25) (emphasis added). 
56
 Murray v. Labor Commission, 2012 UT App 33 at 1W 28-39 (Utah Ct. App. 2012). 
57
 Id at H 35. 
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life." The Allen standard is, by necessity, a test to be applied by analogy and the court 
of appeals underscored the Commission's decision by offering several situations that 
consist of a set of circumstances that are similar to those involved in Mr. Murray's 
accident. To reduce the Allen standard to a strict test of voluntary physical exertion as 
Mr. Murray proposes would strip it of its effect and render it incapable of accomplishing 
what it was designed to do. 
We believe that the Commission and the court of appeals applied the Allen test 
exactly as it was meant to be applied and in the only way that can preserve it as a 
workable standard. We urge this Court to affirm. 
Conclusion 
We maintain that the court of appeals' opinion is a well-reasoned and well-
articulated application of long-established principles of Utah workers' compensation 
law. We maintain that the court of appeals' decision is not only perfectly consistent with 
its own precedent and the prior decisions of this Court, but also with both the letter and 
intent of the Allen decision. The legal questions at issue in this case are not novel or 
new; they are basic, fundamental questions that this Court has more than adequately 
addressed, beginning with the Allen decision itself. The court of appeals did not 
announce any new law or apply any different standard than what it and this Court have 
applied in legal-causation cases decided after Allen. This Court has already settled the 
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questions of state law at issue in this case and the court of appeals - using a consistent 
and appropriate standard of review - properly applied that law to the facts. We ask this 
Court to affirm the court of appeals7 decision. 
Dated this 16th day of October 2012 
Jamison D.Bshby 
Attorney for Utah State Parks & Recreation 
and the Workers Compensation Fund 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Certificate of Compliance 
This brief contains 6,110 words, excluding footnotes, tables, and captions. 
Dated this 16th day of October 2012 
Jamison D.^shby 
Attorney for Utah State Parks & Recreation 
and the Workers Compensation Fund 
1 Q 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Certificate of Service 
On October 16, 2012, I mailed two hard copies of this Brief and two CDs with searchable 
PDF copies of the brief in the case of Michael Murray v. Labor Commission, et al., Case No. 
20120232-SC, to: 
Benjamin Davis, Esq. 
7084 South 2300 East, Suite 250 
P.O. Box 712499 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84171-2499 
Alan L Hennebold, Esq. 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P. O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
